This paper studies the impact of health insurance on individual out-of-pocket (OOP) health expenditure in China. Using the China Health and Nutrition Survey data between 1991 and 2006, we apply two-part and sample selection models that address key empirical challenges: censored data and selection on unobservables. We find that although the probability of positive OOP health expenditures increases with the availability of health insurance, the actual level of OOP health expenditures decreases. More specifically, for a person with positive OOP health expenditures, having health insurance reduces the level of OOP expenses by 11.4 -13.6 percent. This result is highly statistically significant. If, on the other hand, the level of OOP expenses is a priori unknown, we do not find a significant relationship between health insurance and OOP spending levels. In addition, health insurance has stronger effects for individuals with either very low or very high health spending levels based on results from a quantile regression.
Introduction
Current debates about health care reforms in developing countries often focus on improving access to health care at affordable prices in order to reduce the financial burden of households. These reforms invariably deal with the introduction or expansion of either private or public health insurance markets. A widely accepted finding for developed countries is that individuals with health insurance have much lower out-of-pocket (OOP) health expenditures than their uninsured counterparts (see Rubin and Koelln (1993) or Waters, Anderson and Mays (2004) ). However, the effects of health insurance in the context of a developing country where health insurance contracts tend to be less generous are not well understood. In this paper we focus on the role of health insurance in China in the past two decades and examine the impact of health insurance on individual OOP health expenditure. We show that health insurance (i) increases the probability of positive OOP health expenditures and (ii) decreases the level of OOP health expenditures among individuals having medical treatments despite the prevalence of high coinsurance rates.
Since its economic reform in 1978, China has transformed from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. This transformation was aided by a multitude of large scale economic reforms. One such reform triggered a series of changes in the health care sector. Prior to the reform, hospitals were mostly state-run and non-profit. State Owned Enterprises (SOE's) were fully responsible for health care payments of their employees (Wu (2005) ). Since the late 1980s, health care reforms have gradually shifted part of the health care costs from employers to employees (Liu and Liu (2009) ). Government control on prices of drugs and health care was also loosened, so that prices would reflect the health care costs more accurately. Moreover, the reforms have granted hospitals more autonomy in choosing more advanced, but often more expensive technologies and treatments (Hu (1991) ). Consequently, health care spending increased more than three-fold between 1990 and 2001, accounting for 5.4 percent of GDP in 2001 (Meng (2004) ). Meanwhile, traditional health insurance coverage has been decreasing (Akin and Lance (2004) , Du (2009) we also observe a stark increase in the average coinsurance rate (i.e. the portion of the healthcare bill that the patient pays) across all health insurance types ( Figure 2 ). The combination of rising health care expenditures, declining coverage rates, and increases in the coinsurance rates exposes individuals to greater health expenditure risk. Given its implications for China's socioeconomic structure and sustainable economic growth, the role of health insurance and how it influences patients' financial risk exposure need to be carefully examined and understood.
To estimate the effect of health insurance on out-of-pocket health expenditure, we apply twopart and sample selection models, using the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data from 1991 to 2006. These models allow for the identification of two separate channels that affect an individual's health spending. The first channel determines the probability that an individual uses health care. We refer to this as the access channel and estimate it via a participation or selection equation. The second channel describes how much an individual spends on health care conditional on having decided to use health care. We refer to this as the utilization channel which is estimated via an outcome equation. The sum of the effects that work via both channels will indicate the exact marginal effect of health insurance on OOP health expenditure. When calculating marginal effects we account for the high level of data skewness and the two-channel structure.
Several findings emerge. Health insurance significantly increases the probability of positive OOP health care expenditures in China. The insured are more likely to see a doctor when they are sick, whereas the uninsured are more reluctant to seek health care, fearing potentially high health care bills. This effect is strongly statistically significant. Second, concentrating on the group of people with positive OOP health expenditures, we find that health insurance significantly reduces the OOP spending levels of people requiring health care. Thus health insurance helps reduce patients' financial burden. Calculating the marginal effects of health insurance, conditional on having positive OOP health expenses, we find that health insurance reduces the level of OOP spending by 11.4 − 13.6 percent, which is highly significant. On the other hand, if whether a person has positive OOP health expenses is a priori unknown, we do not find a significant negative relationship between insurance and OOP spending anymore. In addition the data show that the probability of accessing a health care provider increases with age and income.
The marginal effect of health insurance on the probability of incurring positive OOP health expenditures increases with age but not with income. Finally, results from a quantile regression indicate that the marginal effect of health insurance on the level of OOP health expenditures is stronger for individuals with either very low or very high spending levels.
Two strands of research in the literature are relevant to our study. The first offers rather descriptive discussions of the process and implications of various health care reforms in China. Akin and Lance (2004) examine the coinsurance rates patterns using CHNS data in the 1990s, and they find that the groups with the largest coverage drops were urban residents, managers, senior professionals, unskilled workers, and service workers. Using CHNS data from 1991 to 2000, Du (2009) shows that China's reform of its state-owned enterprises (SOE's) decreased the coverage rate of urban residents.
The second area of research is more quantitative and focuses on the impact of health insurance on household health expenditures. Estimating a Probit model with instrumental variables using the CHNS in addition to other data on China, Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) find that having health insurance increases the probability of catastrophic OOP health care spending. They explain that this is because insurance encourages people to seek expensive care while providers also choose more expensive treatments for the insured. In a similar way, Wagstaff, Lindelow, Jun, Ling and Juncheng (2009) show that the extension of health insurance to rural areas has not reduced OOP expenses, even though it has increased outpatient and inpatient utilization. In both papers, their focus is on whether the insured exhibit a greater likelihood of high health care spending.
Our study is different in that we concentrate on what causes these somewhat "curious" results of health insurance. We therefore extend our research questions to the following: (i) do the insured have a higher probability to spend OOP on health care, and (ii) among those who pay OOP, do the insured pay less OOP than the uninsured. To separate out the two effects, we face two empirical challenges: censored data and selection on unobservables. We therefore adopt two-part and sample selection models to estimate the effects of health insurance on the likelihood and level of OOP health spending.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section 3 outlines the main models and techniques employed. Section 4 analyzes results and implications. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains all tables and figures as well as derivations of the marginal effects of the selection model.
CHNS data
This paper uses longitudinal data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), collected collaboratively by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention 1 The CHNS started in 1989 and covers eight provinces in China. The surveys followed a large sample of communities, households and individuals in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and are ongoing currently. This paper uses all available waves of the CHNS except for 1989, because the survey design was different in the first wave. The basic sampling unit of the survey was the household. A total of 19, 356 adults from 6, 174 households were observed for the six waves of surveys. 10.16 percent of the individuals participated in all six waves. The remaining individuals only appear in some of the waves. A total of 54, 671 health care records for working age adults were available for the longitudinal analysis. 
Dependent variables
The dependent variables include an indicator variable and a level variable for out-of-pocket (OOP) health expenditures. If OOP health expenditures are positive, then indicator variable d_OOPExp equals one, otherwise zero. The variable measuring OOP health care spending is denoted OOPExp and it records the health care spending in the four-week window prior to the interview, net of any reimbursements from insurance. Among all 54, 671 observations, 5, 304 have positive OOP health expenditures, accounting for 9.6 percent of all observations, hence the value of 0.096 for variable d_OOPExp in Table 1 .
An econometric model on health care spending needs to be cautious about two complications: first, OOP health expenditures are zero for 90 percent of the sample and, second, positive health expenditures are highly right-skewed with a mean of $136 that is much larger than the median of $13.39. A logarithmic transformation eliminates this skewness, with a mean of 2.97 close to the median of 2.66, and the skewness statistic falls from 10.37 to 0.75. The kurtosis is 3.29, close to the normal value of 3. Thus we focus on modeling ln(OOP ) for individuals with positive OOP health expenditures.
Explanatory variables
Health insurance. We use a binary variable Insurance to indicate whether an individual is enrolled in a health insurance plan. In the survey, 31.4 percent of individuals are covered by health insurance. The coinsurance rate is the percentage of the health care bill that the individual pays out-of-pocket. The survey data show that, the average coinsurance rate is 70.9 percent. Such high coinsurance rates are typical in China. According to a survey by the World Health Statistics (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) Guangdong province and bordering Vietnam. The nine provinces in the sample vary significantly in terms of geographic location, economy, culture, and ethnic groups.
Exclusion restrictions. As discussed in more detail in the next section, some models require exclusion restrictions for model identification. We choose time (in minutes) and cost of traveling to the nearest health care facility as exclusion restrictions in the selection models. The average time of travel to the nearest health care facility is 15 minutes and the average cost is 50 cents. Over the years the travel time decreases from 17.1 minutes to 13.6 minutes whereas the cost increases from 13 cents to 92 cents.
Estimation strategy
As discussed in the last section, many individuals do not consume any health care services during the four week window prior to the interview and they therefore report zero OOP health expenditures. In addition, the distribution of positive OOP spending figures is highly right skewed. We propose two possible econometric specifications to address these data issues: twopart models and a bivariate sample selection models. The two-part model is a special case of the bivariate sample selection model with zero correlation between error terms (Cameron and Trivedi (2005) uses a linear regression model to explain the log levels of OOP expenses which is estimated using a maximum likelihood (ML) procedure. By breaking the estimation into these two parts, the model provides a more detailed explanation about how insurance affects OOP health spending.
The two-part model assumes that the errors of the participation equation and the outcome equation are independent. If we consider the possibility of dependence between the error terms of the two equations, then sample selection models are more appropriate. In this paper, we make use of the bivariate sample selection model (Cameron and Trivedi (2005) ).
A In this paper, we provide estimation results based on all three methods. The disadvantage of method (iii) is that it imposes rather strong assumptions on the distribution of the error terms.
However, if the error distribution is correctly specified it is a more efficient estimator than the other two specifications. Method (i) is only weakly identified. Method (ii) is less restrictive on error terms, corrects for the selection bias and the exclusion restrictions help solve the identification problem. Exclusion restrictions only enter the selection equation and ideally those variables only affect the selection equation, but not the outcome equation. Among the available variables in the survey, we chose the log of travel costs to the nearest hospital (logCostT ravHospital) and the time it takes to travel to the nearest hospital (T imeT ravHospital) to be exclusion restrictions.
We expect that the cost and time spent on traveling to medical facilities affect the likelihood of going to the hospital, and hence the likelihood of having positive levels of OOP expenditures, but not necessarily the actual level of the health expenditure.
Whether a two-part model or a selection model is more appropriate depends on the error terms. If the two error terms are uncorrelated after controlling for observed individual characteristics, then the two equations can be modeled separately and the two-part model is appropriate. However, if the errors are correlated, then some unobserved factors are affecting both processes and selection models are more appropriate than the two-part model (Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). log-scale in order to reduce the skewness of the dependent variable. We first investigate the qualitative impact of health insurance on the probability of positive OOP health expenditure as well as on the level of OOP expenditures. This first step is important since earlier studies found that in China, surprisingly, health insurance increases the probability of exposing individuals to catastrophic OOP health expenditure (see Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) ). We therefore first simply report coefficient estimates for the various models as opposed to marginal effects. 7
Estimation Results

Coefficient estimates
Selection equation. All the models show that having health insurance increases the probability of positive OOP expenditure with a similar magnitude of about 0.06 (compare first row in Table 3 ). The positive relationship between insurance and the probability of health spending could be attributed by adverse selection. Individuals in poorer health and in frequent need of health care treatments are more likely to enroll in health insurance plans (e.g. Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) ). If adverse selection exists in our data, then a positive relationship between health insurance and positive spending is expected. Meanwhile, the level of risk aversion may also play a role. Individuals who are more risk-averse are more likely to enroll in health insurance plans and consequently more diligent in visiting doctors and having annual check-ups. Moreover, Chinese hospitals require patients to pay before they provide any treatment (News (2011) ) in order to prevent people from defaulting on their health care bills. It is not uncommon to read news about patients forced out of hospitals because of a lack of funds for payment. A few Chinese hospitals began to experiment with a new "treatment before payment" module in recent years. However, this new policy only applies to insured patients (News (2011) ). Therefore, an important function of health insurance in China is to provide access to health care and not so much in reducing the OOP expenditure levels. The high coinsurance rates we reported in figure 2 earlier also seem to be a testament of this. All these explanations are in support of the observed positive effect of health insurance on the likelihood of positive OOP spending.
Outcome equation. We identify a negative and significant relationship between health insurance and the level of OOP health expenditures, among the group of people with positive OOP expenditures. In all cases, the coefficient on Insurance in the outcome equation is negative, in the range of −0.121 to −0.244 and significant (first row in Table 3 ). Comparing the four models, the Heckman two-step estimator with exclusion restrictions shows the largest negative effect (−0.244) of insurance on the OOP spending level.
The negative estimates of insurance on the spending level highlight a key contribution of our study. Previous research indicates that the insured patients in China are targeted by health care providers and therefore end up having a higher probability to incur catastrophic OOP expenses. Our results point to the opposite conclusion -the insured actually pay less out-ofpocket among those individuals with positive OOP expenses. In order to understand this result, it is important to note that China's health insurance contracts have very high coinsurance rates. (Hougaard, Osterdal and Yu (2008) ). Therefore, the findings in developed countries where hospitals use more expensive treatments on the insured patients than on the uninsured do not necessarily hold in China's case. In fact, our results show that health insurance helps reduce the patients' payment burden once patients seek treatment, despite the very high coinsurance rates. Our estimations therefore indicate that the surprising observation in the literature -that health insurance in China increases the probability of catastrophic health expenditure-has more to do with the increased access to health care and not so much with price gouging of insured patients by providers.
Other covariates. The value of durable goods owned has a significant and positive effect on the level of OOP health expenditures. This is a typical wealth effect. Richer households do not only have easier access to health care, but are also likely to be able to afford more advanced treatment techniques. Everything else equal, individuals with more valuable durable goods turn out to spend more on health care.
Employment status is proven to be important in determining both, the probability and the level of OOP expenses. Compared to a jobless person, a working individual has a lower probability of spending OOP on health care. Meanwhile, being employed has a negative effect on the level of OOP spending, significant at the 5 percent level. Compared to the unemployed, people with jobs have a more regular and healthier life style, which helps reduce their risk of major health hazards. Second, insurance plans through companies (i.e. group insurance plans) tend to be more generous than insurance plans purchased by private individuals. In the CHNS data we find average coinsurance rates for employer provided health insurance of around 53 percent, whereas other insurance types have coinsurance rates as high as 90 percent. Relative to the unemployed, employed individuals are covered by better insurance plans, which decrease their OOP payments.
The coefficient estimates on the indicator variable identifying government officials is positive for both, selection and outcome equations. However, none of these estimates are statistically significant.
People living in rural areas are less likely to have positive OOP expenditures than people in urban neighborhoods. Even when they incur positive OOP health expenditures, they spend less than people living in urban areas. The coefficient estimates on Rural areas in the selection equation are all negative and significant at the 1 percent level. In the outcome equation, the estimates are all negative and significant with the exception of the selection model with exclusion restrictions estimated by the two-step procedure (column 6 in Table 3 ). People in rural areas seem less health conscious due to a lack of education and health information. For minor illnesses, individuals either choose treatment plans allowing them to self treat without professional super-vision, or they ignore their illness completely. Second, less than 20 percent of total health care resources are allocated to the rural population (MinistryofHealth (2011)). In rural areas facilities are basic and medical personnel is often poorly trained with limited access to equipment and drugs. The rural population relies more on traditional Chinese medicine as well. Rural health clinics charge significantly less than urban health facilities due to the lower quality of health care services provided (CIGNA (2011)). Many rural clinics are only equipped to treat minor illnesses or injuries, whereas urban hospitals are capable of treating more severe illnesses. As a result health insurance reduces the likelihood of positive OOP expenditure in rural areas, and once individuals do go to rural clinics, the treatment costs are generally lower than in urban hospitals.
Other demographic variables include educational level, age, gender, family size and marital status. We find that education lowers the probability but increases the level of health spending.
However, these coefficient estimates are insignificant in all three model specifications. There is a quadratic relationship between age and the possibility of spending. The coefficient estimate for variable Age is negative while that for variable Age 2 is positive. They are both significant at the 1 percent level. As people age they are less likely to spend on health care when young and increasingly more likely to spend on health care when old. The selection equation provides positive coefficient estimates for Female, significant at the 1 percent in all four models. We find a small negative relationship between family size and the probability of positive OOP spending.
The coefficient estimates are very similar across all models and also significant at the 1 percent level. There is no evidence for a statistically significant impact of family size on the spending level. Even though the two-part model and the selection two-step model seem to provide similar estimates, we need to consider the following complications: if exactly the same regressors are used in the selection and outcome equations (and they are here), then the selection model is close to unidentified due to multicollinearity problems (Cameron and Trivedi (2005) ). The solution is to include proper exclusion restrictions -variables which only affect the selection process but not the outcome -to help identify the model. In this paper, we introduce two variables as exclusion restrictions, time and cost of traveling to the nearest hospital, to ensure model identification.
The coefficient estimates for Cost of travel and Time of travel are both positive and statistically significant at the one percent level.
With exclusion restrictions, the selection two-step (Columns 5-6) and the selection ML (Columns 7-8) estimates agree on a negative and significant correlation coefficient between the error terms. 
Marginal effects
So far we have concentrated on the qualitative aspects of health insurance and other covariates.
We next concentrate on the quantitative effects and follow the procedure in Hoffman and Kassouf (2005) to calculate marginal effects. The mathematical derivation is included in the Appendix, and the results are presented in Table 4 . Unconditional and conditional marginal effects are calculated respectively for the two-part model and the selection MLE with exclusion restrictions.
Unconditional marginal effect calculations factor in the entire sample whereas conditional mar-ginal effects are calculated based on individuals with positive OOP health expenditures. The results from both models are fairly similar in both signs and magnitudes. The procedure in Hoffman and Kassouf (2005) requires us to interpret all the numbers in Table 4 as percentage terms (see expression (3) and (2) for details).
Conditional on having positive OOP payments, health insurance reduces the level of OOP expenditures by 11.4 − 13.56 percent (depending on the econometric model), significant at the 1 percent level. Unconditionally, health insurance reduces the level of OOP expenses by only 0.2 − 3.9 percent; however, this result is not statistically significant. The fact that the conditional marginal effect of health insurance is much larger than the unconditional, demonstrates the importance of health insurance for individuals with illnesses.
Let us compare two individuals, both with positive OOP expenditure. Assume the two have the same characteristics except that one has insurance and the other does not. Our estimates
show that the insured person will pay between 11 to 13 percent less OOP on health care than the uninsured one. Since both of them are in the positive OOP spending group, they are in need of health care, and the health insurance helps to reduce the financial burden significantly.
We next compare two individuals whose OOP spending levels are unknown -maybe zero or maybe positive. Again, we assume the two have the exact same characteristics except for health insurance. In this case, health insurance reduces expected OOP payments by a smaller amount.
These two individuals are drawn from the entire sample, and they may or may not need health care, and thus they may or may not have OOP spending. Accounting for the probability of zero spending, it is not surprising to see that the unconditional marginal effect is so much smaller than the conditional one.
Individuals spend 3 to 5 percent more on health care when their income level goes up by a dollar. They spend 3.9 to 5.7 percent more on health care if the value of durables owned increases by a dollar. The value of durables is a rough measure for people's wealth and living standard.
The estimation results show that people with higher income levels and better living standards tend to spend more on health care. Conditional on seeking health care, having a job reduces health payments by 21 percent. The unconditional effect is larger at 28 − 29 percent. Employed individuals are expected to have better health conditions and thus lower OOP expenditures.
Residents in rural areas pay significantly less than urban residents, by 22 percent (conditional) and 33 percent (unconditional). The price level of medical care in rural areas tends to be much lower than in urban areas. In addition, hospitals and clinics in rural areas charge less as they offer lower medical quality than the more modern hospitals in the urban areas. Conditional on having spent money out-of-pocket, people spend about 5.5 percent more every year as they age.
The unconditional marginal effects of age are insignificant. Based on the whole sample, females spend about 15 percent more than males. One of the factors that contributes to this gender difference is child birth. Unconditionally, individuals from larger families spend 6.3 − 6.8 percent less than those with a small family. Based on the whole sample, married people spend 29 − 32 percent more than unmarried ones; based on the group with positive health spending, marriage raises one's health spending bill by 13 − 14 percent.
Lastly, health status is one of the most important factors determining health spending levels.
Compared to individuals with excellent health conditions, individuals with good, fair, and poor health spend 56, 484, and 3, 026 percent more out-of-pocket. These are the unconditional effects.
If we only look at the group with positive health spending, then the corresponding numbers are 9.5, 62, and 278 percent. We next provide a brief explanation for why the unconditional effects of health status are much larger than the conditional ones?
If we randomly draw someone from the entire sample, ex-ante, the probability that this individual has "poor" health is very small. However, if this person turns out to be in poor health, then she is expected to spend about 3, 026 percent (or 30 times) more than someone in excellent health. For the conditional marginal effect, we again focus on those individuals who have spent money OOP on health care. This group of people are more homogenous so that the actual difference in health status between excellent health and poor health is likely to be smaller.
In other words, the variance of health status for this group of people is smaller than for the whole data sample. Conditional on having spent on health care, the ones with poor health are expected to spend 278 percent (or 2.78 times) more than those reporting to have excellent health.
Robustness
Marginal effects. Another method to retransform the expectation of the dependent variable from logs into levels if normality in the errors cannot be obtained is the smearing estimator in Duan (1983) . This method, if applied by subgroup, may even control for some of the heteroskedasticity. However, according to Deb, Manning and Norton (2010) , group-wise smearing will create major precision losses. They therefore suggest the use of a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) with a log link function that results in easily interpretable coefficient estimates. In a generalized linear model with a log link function it is assumed that
instead of E [ln (OOPExp i ) |x i ] = x i β with standard OLS on a log transformed dependent variable. This by-passes the retransformation problem as we can now simply calculate the marginal effects according to
On the other hand, the GLM estimator requires the determination of the relationship between xβ and y as well as the specification of the error distribution. After running a Box-Cox test, we determine that the log transformation on y is indeed appropriate and after running a modified Park test, we determine that the Gamma distribution is appropriate to model the error structure. 8 We then use the GLM model and regress OOPExp for the group that has positive levels of OOP health expenditures. The marginal effects are therefore conditional on OOPExp > 0,
, and represent the marginal effects of the outcome equation (i.e.
second part of a two-part model). We report the average marginal effects conditional on positive OOP spending in table 5, where we also break down the results by survey year in order to investigate how the development of China's health care system in recent years may have affected the generosity of insurances and thereby changed the risk exposure of Chinese households. The marginal effects in Table 5 are in levels and not in percent as in Table 4 . Selection equation. We next concentrate on the selection equation of the two-part model and report the baseline probability of incurring positive OOP health expenditures. We want to see whether health insurance increases or decreases this baseline probability, controlling for some important variables. Since health expenditures are highly correlated with age and income, we present the baseline probabilities along these two dimensions in figure 3 . Panel (1) shows the confidence interval for the baseline probability of positive OOP spending as age changes. Panel We calculate the baseline probability and the marginal effects for a representative individual, defined as a working 45 year old (subject to change in panels (1) and (2)) female, working in the private sector, with 10 years of education and median income (subject to change in panels (3) and (4)), living in an urban area, in good health, and with no health insurance.
In Figure 3 , panel (1), we see that the baseline probability of incurring positive OOP health expenditures increases steadily as the individual gets older. When she is 20 years old, the individual faces a 6 percent probability of incurring positive OOP health expenditures. An individual who is 70 years old has a 80 percent chance of requiring medical assistance that would trigger positive OOP expenses. The marginal effects of health insurance are statistically significant and increase with age. These inter cohort differences are statistically significant and indicate that health insurance has a stronger effect of increasing the probability of positive OOP health expenditure if an individual gets older.
We next investigate whether similar results can be derived when comparing across income groups. In panel (3) we show that the baseline probabilities of incurring positive OOP health expenditures increase with total household income. The baseline probability of incurring positive OOP expenditures increases with income. The differences in the marginal effect of health insurance on positive OOP health expenditures are indistinguishable between different income groups. This result is in line with the estimates from the two-part and selection models where it was already shown that income had very weak explanatory power in the participation or selection equations.
Outcome equation. We finally estimate the effect of health insurance over the conditional distribution of OOP health expenditures. Figure 4 shows results from a quantile regression of OOP health expenditures on health insurance and other covariates for the subsample with positive OOP health expenditures. We are interested in whether the effects of health insurance vary between low utilization and high utilization of health care. From Figure 4 we see that the negative marginal effect of health insurance for individuals spending at the tails of the OOP health spending distribution (the very low spending quantiles as well as the very high spending quantiles) is considerably larger than for individuals spending closer to the median. Health insurance therefore has a stronger containment effect on OOP spending when the OOP spending levels are either very low or very high.
One explanation for this result could of course be that the low and high spending groups have more generous health insurance than individuals that populate the center of the spending distribution. The low spending group are predominantly individuals who are relatively healthy and/or have good health insurance with low coinsurance rates. When these individuals do see a provider for minor treatments, health insurance will cover a large part of the bill. On the other hand, individuals at the upper end of the OOP expenditure distribution tend to be less healthy and are therefore more likely to purchase better insurance with lower coinsurance rates. For both groups health insurance therefore has a relatively large effect in terms of reducing OOP spending.
We find more evidence of this comparing coinsurance rates for low and high spenders. Individuals in the lowest OOP spending quartile have coinsurance rates of around 40 percent.
Individuals spending in the upper quartile have coinsurance rates that are around 90 percent.
However, the groups in the middle quartiles (those with average OOP health spending levels)
have the highest coinsurance rates at 92 percent. We therefore see that insurance does more for individuals at the extremes of the OOP spending distribution than for average spenders. Finally, comparing coinsurance rates by health status we do find evidence that individuals with the worst health conditions (i.e. self reported "poor" health) have lower coinsurance rates ( 84 percent average coinsurance rate) compared to individuals with fair health (86 percent average coinsurance rate) and good health ( 91 percent average coinsurance rate). Which supports our earlier claim that insurance for low spending individuals tends to be more generous and therefore more effective in reducing their OOP health expenditures.
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that health insurance in China increases the probability of positive OOP health expenditures. However, among individuals who have positive OOP health expenditure, health insurance decrease the spending levels despite the relatively high coinsurance rates of Chinese health insurance contracts. We have therefore provided a refinement of earlier results in the literature that demonstrated that health insurance increases the probability of financial exposure. Earlier studies do not distinguish between the health insurance's effect on the probability of positive OOP expenses and the level of OOP expenses. In order to identify the two channels, we estimate two-part and sample selection models in this paper.
These results are not dissimilar to results found for the U.S. and other developed countries.
Our estimates also show that people who work, live in rural areas, or have a larger family tend to spend less on health care. Income and the value of durable goods, both, have positive effects on OOP health spending levels. People who are older, female, or married tend to spend more on health care. Lastly, self-report health status is shown to be a good indicator of health care
spending. Individuals with the worst health status spend about 30 times more than the healthiest.
Even when we focus on the subsample of individuals with positive OOP health spending levels, the least healthy still pay about 2.78 times more than the healthy. Finally, when investigating along the entire distribution of OOP health expenditures we find that health insurance has larger effects for low and high spenders than for individuals who spend close to the median.
Appendix
Conditional and unconditional marginal effects in the Heckman selection model with a log dependent variable
Here we briefly outline the derivation of conditional and unconditional marginal effects in the Heckman selection model with a log transformed dependent variable. We follow the exposition in Hoffman and Kassouf (2005) as well as Vance (2006) and derive the conditional and unconditional marginal effects in the Heckman selection model.
Conditional marginal effects.
The expectation of log expenditures can be written as
where α u = −x ′ 1 β 1 and λ(α u ) is the inverse Mill's ratio. We derive these results using the normalized standard deviation of ǫ 1 = 1. The inverse Mill's ratio is defined as
, where φ and Φ are the normal density and the normal cumulative distribution function, respectively. Denote β λ = ρσ 2 , and
and the conditional marginal effect (CME) of a binary variable x ki on ln (OOP Exp i ) is
Because of the log transformation, we need to be careful when interpreting the CME for spending levels (rather than log of spending). If c is the estimated value of the CME (for the logged spending), then the estimated percentage change in the spending level is
Unconditional marginal effects. The unconditional expected value of spending comes from both selection and outcome equations and can be written as
Taking logs results in
and taking derivatives with respect to the continuous independent variable x ki we have
As shown in Hoffman and Kassouf (2005) , if the relative changes on OOPExp i triggered by changes in x ki are independent of the status quo value of OOPExp i , then
Therefore, the unconditional marginal effect (UME) of a continuous variable
e ll Again, due to the logarithm transformation of spending levels, the percentage change in health care expenditure due to a unit increase in x ki is
and the UME of a binary variable is
where
We transform the coefficient estimates using expressions (2) and (3) since the dependent variable is in logs and the original parameter estimates cannot be interpreted directly. Results for these estimates are shown in table 4. CHNS 1991 CHNS , 1993 CHNS , 1997 CHNS , 2000 CHNS , 2004 CHNS , and 2006 Figure 3 : Baseline probability of spending a positive amount out-of-pocket and marginal effects of health insurance on positive OOP health expenditures. We report marginal effects of a working female with median income, no health insurance, 10 years of education, living in an urban area, in good health. 
Tables
